Serious bug in Nettle's ecdsa_verify

  • Done
  • quality assurance status badge
Details
6 participants
  • Leo Famulari
  • Léo Le Bouter
  • Ludovic Courtès
  • Mark H Weaver
  • Niels Möller
  • (
Owner
unassigned
Submitted by
Mark H Weaver
Severity
important
M
M
Mark H Weaver wrote on 18 Mar 2021 01:21
(address . bug-guix@gnu.org)
87blbhia4i.fsf@netris.org
FYI...

-------------------- Start of forwarded message --------------------
From: nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels Möller)
To: nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Serious bug in Nettle's ecdsa_verify
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 09:07:56 +0100

I've been made aware of a bug in Nettle's code to verify ECDSA
signatures. Certain signatures result in the ecc point multiply function
being called with out-of-range scalars, which may give incorrect
results, or crash in an assertion failure. It's an old bug, probably
since Nettle's initial implementation of ECDSA.

I've just pushed fixes for ecdsa_verify, as well as a few other cases of
potentially out-of-range scalars, to the master-updates branch. I haven't
fully analysed the implications, but I'll describe my current
understanding.

I think an assertion failure, useful for a denial-of-service attack, is
easy on the curves where the bitsize of q, the group order, is not an
integral number of words. That's secp224r1, on 64-bit platforms, and
secp521r1.

Even when it's not possible to trigger an assertion failure, it's easy
to produce valid-looking input "signatures" that hit out-of range
intermediate scalar values where point multiplication may misbehave.
This applies to all the NIST secp* curves as well as the GOST curves.

To me, it looks very difficult to make it misbehave in such a way that
ecdsa_verify will think an invalid signature is valid, but it might be
possible; further analysis is needed. I will not be able to analyze it
properly now, if anyone else would like to look into it, I can provide a
bit more background.

ed25519 and ed448 may be affected too, but it appears a bit harder to
find inputs that hit out of range values. And since point operations are
inherently more robust on these curves, I think they will produce
correct results as long as they don't hit the assert.

Advise on how to deal best with this? My current plan is to prepare a
3.7.2 bugfix release (from a new bugfix-only branch, without the new
arm64 code). Maybe as soon as tomorrow (Wednesday, european time), or in
the weekend.

Regards,
/Niels

--
Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677.
Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

_______________________________________________
nettle-bugs mailing list
nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se
-------------------- End of forwarded message --------------------
L
L
Ludovic Courtès wrote on 18 Mar 2021 14:27
control message for bug #47222
(address . control@debbugs.gnu.org)
874kh8r3rc.fsf@gnu.org
tags 47222 + security
quit
L
L
Ludovic Courtès wrote on 18 Mar 2021 14:27
(address . control@debbugs.gnu.org)
8735wsr3r8.fsf@gnu.org
severity 47222 important
quit
M
M
Mark H Weaver wrote on 21 Mar 2021 20:47
[Niels Möller] ANNOUNCE: Nettle-3.7.2
(address . 47222@debbugs.gnu.org)
875z1kl24h.fsf@netris.org
-------------------- Start of forwarded message --------------------
From: nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels Möller)
To: nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se, info-gnu@gnu.org
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Nettle-3.7.2
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 10:24:11 +0100
I've prepared a new bug-fix release of Nettle, a low-level
cryptographics library, to fix a serious bug in the function to verify
ECDSA signatures. Implications include an assertion failure, which could
be used for denial-of-service, when verifying signatures on the
secp_224r1 and secp521_r1 curves. More details in NEWS file below.

Upgrading is strongly recomended.

The Nettle home page can be found at

The release can be downloaded from

ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz

Regards,
/Niels

NEWS for the Nettle 3.7.2 release

This is a bugfix release, fixing a bug in ECDSA signature
verification that could lead to a denial of service attack
(via an assertion failure) or possibly incorrect results. It
also fixes a few related problems where scalars are required
to be canonically reduced modulo the ECC group order, but in
fact may be slightly larger.

Upgrading to the new version is strongly recommended.

Even when no assert is triggered in ecdsa_verify, ECC point
multiplication may get invalid intermediate values as input,
and produce incorrect results. It's trivial to construct
alleged signatures that result in invalid intermediate values.
It appears difficult to construct an alleged signature that
makes the function misbehave in such a way that an invalid
signature is accepted as valid, but such attacks can't be
ruled out without further analysis.

Thanks to Guido Vranken for setting up the fuzzer tests that
uncovered this problem.

The new version is intended to be fully source and binary
compatible with Nettle-3.6. The shared library names are
libnettle.so.8.3 and libhogweed.so.6.3, with sonames
libnettle.so.8 and libhogweed.so.6.

Bug fixes:

* Fixed bug in ecdsa_verify, and added a corresponding test
case.

* Similar fixes to ecc_gostdsa_verify and gostdsa_vko.

* Similar fixes to eddsa signatures. The problem is less severe
for these curves, because (i) the potentially out or range
value is derived from output of a hash function, making it
harder for the attacker to to hit the narrow range of
problematic values, and (ii) the ecc operations are
inherently more robust, and my current understanding is that
unless the corresponding assert is hit, the verify
operation should complete with a correct result.

* Fix to ecdsa_sign, which with a very low probability could
return out of range signature values, which would be
rejected immediately by a verifier.

--
Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677.
Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEy0li0HDXfX/Li6Nicdjx/zaMZncFAmBXELsACgkQcdjx/zaM
ZneWkQf/aMxAqQvP/iJpJcUfgH3A6K1hrUzzs2tVEhC47nXEsFPkJZVWEiK0KkxQ
Sfj8R7J79P/0xCCv5eoEmllcXgHH2+RAU/vkELuWPS0N6HKsLAPlCf9LwnYunyzt
O8ZGiefxTALAZ9gkROqKNoQejikFNLXfb4erW2ErLBgggTbTRURjxRRQH6xuMeWm
W6OBXZe338sAqBJ2PVc+b36zyeWYfSwA0QOuYuguuYHsgdprvOUoY3JWhHrGt61o
VfA9mKMV6bV3Wdror7F2moz2RU7EEShBUZZBA/5zEBD4A8tN92FsOv2Duxzjeby9
BzAMDXsVsxWOoI2a6+dSnNvgq8fUkw==
=TY4P
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
If you have a working or partly working program that you'd like
to offer to the GNU project as a GNU package,
-------------------- End of forwarded message --------------------
L
L
Ludovic Courtès wrote on 25 Mar 2021 10:51
Re: bug#47222: Serious bug in Nettle's ecdsa_verify
(name . Niels Möller)(address . nisse@lysator.liu.se)
87h7kzblxk.fsf_-_@gnu.org
Hi Niels,

Toggle quote (8 lines)
> I've prepared a new bug-fix release of Nettle, a low-level
> cryptographics library, to fix a serious bug in the function to verify
> ECDSA signatures. Implications include an assertion failure, which could
> be used for denial-of-service, when verifying signatures on the
> secp_224r1 and secp521_r1 curves. More details in NEWS file below.
>
> Upgrading is strongly recomended.

Are there plans to make a new 3.5 release including these fixes?
Alternatively, could you provide guidance as to which commits should be
cherry-picked in 3.5 for downstream distros?

I’m asking because in Guix, the easiest way for us to deploy the fixes
on the ‘master’ branch would be by “grafting” a new Nettle variant
ABI-compatible with 3.5.1, which is the one packages currently depend on.

Thanks in advance,
Ludo’.
N
N
Niels Möller wrote on 25 Mar 2021 17:21
(name . Ludovic Courtès)(address . ludo@gnu.org)
cpfh7kzjjaj.fsf@slartibartfast.lysator.liu.se
Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> writes:

Toggle quote (2 lines)
> Are there plans to make a new 3.5 release including these fixes?

No, I don't plan any 3.5.x release.

Toggle quote (3 lines)
> Alternatively, could you provide guidance as to which commits should be
> cherry-picked in 3.5 for downstream distros?

Look at the branch release-3.7-fixes
The commits since 3.7.1 are the ones you need.

Changes to gostdsa and ed448 will not apply, since those curves didn't
exist in nettle-3.5. Changes to ed25519 might not apply cleanly, due to
refactoring when adding ed448.

Toggle quote (4 lines)
> I’m asking because in Guix, the easiest way for us to deploy the fixes
> on the ‘master’ branch would be by “grafting” a new Nettle variant
> ABI-compatible with 3.5.1, which is the one packages currently depend on.

I still recommend upgrading to the latest version. There were an abi
break in 3.6 (so you'd need to recompile lots of guix packages), but no
incompatible changes to the (source level) api.

Regards,
/Niels

--
Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677.
Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.
L
L
Leo Famulari wrote on 25 Mar 2021 19:16
(name . Niels Möller)(address . nisse@lysator.liu.se)
YFzTkk51ufdpvDGD@jasmine.lan
On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 05:21:40PM +0100, Niels Möller wrote:
Toggle quote (4 lines)
> Changes to gostdsa and ed448 will not apply, since those curves didn't
> exist in nettle-3.5. Changes to ed25519 might not apply cleanly, due to
> refactoring when adding ed448.

Okay.

Toggle quote (8 lines)
> > I’m asking because in Guix, the easiest way for us to deploy the fixes
> > on the ‘master’ branch would be by “grafting” a new Nettle variant
> > ABI-compatible with 3.5.1, which is the one packages currently depend on.
>
> I still recommend upgrading to the latest version. There were an abi
> break in 3.6 (so you'd need to recompile lots of guix packages), but no
> incompatible changes to the (source level) api.

Unfortunately, non-ABI compatible upgrades of nettle cannot be done
quickly in Guix. As you point out, we'd have to recompile over >10000
packages, and then we'd have to fix any breakage that might occur from
the upgrade.

We will have to try to cherry-pick the bug fix patches.
L
L
Léo Le Bouter wrote on 6 Apr 2021 13:09
Serious bug in Nettle's ecdsa_verify
(address . 47222@debbugs.gnu.org)
082e0d953dd34519b597f675a72299c2e7a4917c.camel@zaclys.net
I am no expert cryptographer, it is likely that if I try backporting
such patches I will get something wrong that introduces more flaws.

backported yet
either

It would be best if Nettle adopted a forever (or almost) backwards
compatible ABI from now on like curl (https://curl.se/libcurl/abi.html)
so that such things don't happen again.

Thank you,
Léo
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=yljb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


L
L
Ludovic Courtès wrote on 16 Apr 2021 22:46
(address . 47222@debbugs.gnu.org)
87im4m2c05.fsf@gnu.org
Hi!

(- Niels, - nettle-bugs)

nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels Möller) skribis:

Toggle quote (17 lines)
> Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> writes:
>
>> Are there plans to make a new 3.5 release including these fixes?
>
> No, I don't plan any 3.5.x release.
>
>> Alternatively, could you provide guidance as to which commits should be
>> cherry-picked in 3.5 for downstream distros?
>
> Look at the branch release-3.7-fixes
> (https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/commits/release-3.7-fixes/).
> The commits since 3.7.1 are the ones you need.
>
> Changes to gostdsa and ed448 will not apply, since those curves didn't
> exist in nettle-3.5. Changes to ed25519 might not apply cleanly, due to
> refactoring when adding ed448.

I confirm these patches don’t apply, and I’m not comfortable fiddling
with that.

Leo and I checked and found that Debian doesn’t have 3.5. Do other
distros have backports of these patches to 3.5?

If not, our options are:

1. to invest in the backport ourselves, with good peer review, ideally
getting it stamped by Niels & co;

2. to wait until a full rebuild has come.

It’s not an ideal situation. Thoughts?

Ludo’.
(
(
( wrote on 8 Aug 2022 19:11
(address . 47222-done@debbugs.gnu.org)
CM0TBR948W8B.2JY3QM6WIGB4A@guix-aspire
We now have nettle 3.7.3, so this isn't an issue anymore. Closing.

-- (
Closed
?
Your comment

This issue is archived.

To comment on this conversation send an email to 47222@debbugs.gnu.org

To respond to this issue using the mumi CLI, first switch to it
mumi current 47222
Then, you may apply the latest patchset in this issue (with sign off)
mumi am -- -s
Or, compose a reply to this issue
mumi compose
Or, send patches to this issue
mumi send-email *.patch